Agricultural producer participation and spatial coordination of land use decisions are key components for enhancing the effective delivery of ecosystem services from private land. However, inducing participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes for coordinating land management choices is challenging from a policy design perspective owing to transaction costs associated with participation. This paper employs a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of such costs on participation and land use in the context of an Agglomeration Bonus (AB) scheme. The AB creates a coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria related to alternative spatially-coordinated land use patterns. The experiment varies transaction costs between two levels (high and low), which affects the risks and payoffs of coordinating on the different equilibria. Additionally, an option to communicate is implemented between neighboring producers arranged on a local network to facilitate spatial coordination. Results indicate a significant difference in participation and performance under high and low transaction costs, with lower uptake and performance when transaction costs are high. These effects are, however, impacted by transaction costs faced in the past. Communication improves both AB participation rates and performance with the effect being greater for participants facing high transaction costs.
Introduction
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) or agri-environmental schemes offer agricultural producers financial incentives for actions designed to increase the supply of ecosystem services from privately owned land Hanley and White 2014) . In many instances, spatial coordination is a desirable feature of such schemes, enabling the delivery of greater ecosystem service benefits compared to a situation where the uptake of contracts is spatially uncoordinated. Examples include greater biodiversity conservation benefits on farmland (Merckx et al. 2009; Dallimer et al. 2010; Wätzold et al. 2010) , successful species reintroduction programmes and meta-population management on private land where habitat corridors permit wildlife movements, or where certain minimum sized contiguous habitat is needed (Williams et al. 2005; Önal and Briers 2006) , enhanced water quality improvements (Lane et al. 2004; Lane et al. 2006) , and native vegetation restoration (Windle et al. 2009 ).
Since participation in PES schemes is voluntary, economists have looked for tools to incentivize spatial coordination. One such option is the Agglomeration Bonus (AB), originally developed by Parkhurst et al. (2002) . The AB is a two-part payment mechanism where producers receive compensation for participating/enrolling in a PES-type programme, plus a bonus if neighboring agricultural producers participate and select the same land use activity. In this format, the AB resembles a coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria pertaining to different land use choices. These Nash equilibria can be Pareto ranked by their payoffs. Laboratory experiments have indicated that such a payment structure can produce a range of desired spatial patterns of enrolled land parcels Warziniack et al. 2007 ). However, Banerjee et al. (2012; found that spatial coordination is challenging, and the AB can often fail to produce the desired spatial patterns owing to coordination failure.
Participation in any PES scheme incurs transaction costs for the producers (Shortle et al. 1998; Kampas and White 2004) . Examples of such costs include producers' travel time to meetings with government officials, the time and cognitive effort of determining the relative payoffs of signing or not signing a contract, and the costs of engaging farm and ranch advisors. Such transaction costs have been shown empirically to reduce participation in PES schemes (Falconer and Saunders 2002; McCann et al. 5 ranking. Such differences in environmental benefits from spatial coordination of enrolment might reflect differences in the ecological objectives of a scheme, or in the kinds of land use changes that are rewarded.
Let ( = NP denote non-participation for producer i whereby land is devoted to profit-based conventional agriculture, earning only agricultural returns. 2 The AB scheme consists of two payoff components. The base component is a participation subsidy, ( , intended to compensate for any opportunity cost of conservation relative to profitmaximising agricultural land use. Producer i receives an additional bonus, ( , if a neighboring landowner implements the same conservation land use practice as them. Thus, the total bonus received is proportional to the number of neighbors choosing the same land use strategy, denoted by (/ . We assume that the environmental agency provides AB payments for adoption of pro-conservation land use of one type only, i.e., producers cannot choose both X and Y. We make this assumption because (i) PES schemes typically involve a menu of land use practices from which producers usually can select a few suitable ones, and (ii) paying some landowners for undertaking all listed actions may exhaust the limited PES budget (Cooper, Hart, and Baldock 2009; Armsworth et al. 2012) , creating high participation clusters in some areas at the expense of low participation rates elsewhere. 3 Let ( denote the agricultural revenue under land use ( = , , .
If a producer i chooses to participate in the scheme he or she incurs transaction costs, ( . We assume that everyone has identical transaction costs, i.e., ( = , which are either High or Low depending on the treatment. In practice, these costs will vary substantially across producers and across land use strategies. However, by sacrificing some realism (which would probably not cause large behavioral differences) we gain tractability to identify causal treatment effects. The payoff, ( ( , of producer under the AB scheme reads as follows:
In Eq.
(1) the number of neighbors and hence the bonus payment is contingent on the specific landscape structure. Following Banerjee et al. (2012 Banerjee et al. ( , 2014 , in this study we impose a simple circular network structure to represent neighborhood interactions. On such a circular local network (/ can either take the value 0, 1 or 2. By employing a circular network each individual faces the same level of strategic uncertainty within the decision environment, since all have the same number of neighbors. 4 Given this spatial symmetry in terms of network location, we avoid additional complications such as holdout problems due to bargaining power of some individuals who are strategically located. In networks featuring an asymmetric neighborhood structure (e.g., a two-dimensional lattice grid or a straight-line), individuals could respond differently to the transaction cost variation and information available through communication.
We note here that while the choice of network structure is simpler than the more complex spatial grids implemented by Parkhurst et al. (2002) and Parkhurst and Shogren (2007) , it still captures the main strategic interdependencies that are relevant for studying spatially contiguous land use. First, in many realistic environments, individuals typically do not interact with all individuals within their network directly but perhaps only interact with a few closely linked peers who provide them with information about what others within the same network are doing. Second, like more complex spatial grids, a circular network also exhibits strategic uncertainty regarding individuals' decisions, especially if individuals have imperfect information about the choices of those who are not their direct neighbors (see Banerjee et al., 2014) . In that sense, while simple, our strategic setting is relevant to studying PES institutions. The payoff function specification in Eq.
(1) makes the AB mechanism a coordination game with Nash equilibria pertaining to situations where individuals and their neighbors choose the same land use strategy.
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The AB coordination game has a Pareto efficient and multiple risk dominant Nash equilibrium strategies (Harsanyi and Selten 1988; Parkhurst et al. 2002) . Strategy X corresponds to the Pareto efficient strategy as it generates the highest payoffs (because it has the greatest environmental benefits and hence highest agglomeration bonus). Strategy Y on the other hand constitutes a situation of coordination failure explained by the presence of strategic uncertainty within the game environment. That is, it might be less risky for a subject to choose the land use practice Y as it corresponds to a lower payoff loss in the event that one or more neighbors choose not to coordinate on the efficient strategy X. Strategy NP is also an equilibrium strategy which does not involve participating in the AB scheme. This coordination game is similar to critical mass coordination games where the payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a specific number of players also choose that action (Devetag 2003) .
In the context of the AB mechanism, Appendix B.I contains all parameters that have been used to construct the Payoff Tables 1a and 1b for the High (T = 40) and Low (T = 15) transaction cost treatments, respectively. The AB payments for X and Y are chosen to reflect the fact that ecosystem services generated through adoption of X land use are spatially contingent to a higher degree than those generated through Y. For example, X can correspond to land uses leading to a reduction of habitat fragmentation.
Here, the location of adopted use matters much more than in the situation where land use involves reduction in fertilizer use where the number of adoptees may matter more than their location. The value of the high transactions cost is chosen such that the game has two Nash equilibria: ( = (∀ ) and the outside option ( = (∀ ) with the former one Pareto dominating the latter. Choosing land use practice Y is not a Nash equilibrium because it is strictly dominated by NP. Therefore, if a subject chooses to pay the fee and participate in the scheme, he or she would be likely to choose X over Y. The high transaction cost thus eliminates the coordination problem in the event of participation.
In fact, the high cost can also be interpreted as a form of signalling, credible costly communication or tacit-communication (Blume and Ortmann 2007) , and combined with forward induction can reduce the strategic uncertainty associated with the presence of multiple Nash equilibria and guide behavior towards the efficient X choice (Blume and Ortmann 2007) . 5 In contrast, for the low transaction cost setting, selection of Y by a landowner and both direct neighbors leads to a payoff which is not strictly dominated by the reservation payoff, yielding a third Nash equilibrium ( = ∀ . This Nash equilibrium is risk dominant relative to the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium ( = (∀ ). Although forward induction is no longer applicable in this setting, the low transaction cost can still serve as a cheaper form of costly communication reducing the underlying strategic uncertainty of the game and focusing subjects' attention on the efficient X strategy. These conjectures are along the lines of theory presented by Hurkens (1996) in which the prospect of incurring a cost before game play can facilitate coordination on the efficient Nash equilibrium outcome. In our game the subjects have to incur the cost to move to the AB game stage, which may strengthen the ability of the transaction cost induced costlycommunication mechanism to generate participation and efficient coordination.
Further, for the high transaction cost setting, T is greater than the participation payment for strategy X only. We chose this format because if the transaction cost is less than the participation components for both X and Y, participation is trivially incentivized even in the presence of the transaction cost and in the absence of the bonus. This is not an interesting case. The high cost T value is also not set to be greater than the participation payments for both strategies because this feature would further reduce landowner appeal to participate in the AB scheme. Under the low cost condition, the transaction cost value is less than the participation component for both X and Y to generate a situation where participation is individually rational. We did not set T to be greater than both the participation components for reasons similar to those for the high-cost environment. Finally, setting the low value of T to be greater than the participation component for any one of the strategies would have been interesting but we decided to consider a scenario where incentives to participate are enhanced since, in the high-cost setting, participation barriers are substantial. Given this setup, we have two hypotheses: Additionally, the individual's land use choice, and hence the ability of the AB scheme to reach the efficient outcome and maximize ecosystem services benefits, is influenced by the degree of community-level communication and interactions. This is especially important in PES schemes where producers need to spatially coordinate their decisions (Lawley and Yang 2015) . Communication can provide an opportunity to (i) announce and declare sustained commitment for a particular action, (ii) articulate reasons for having made a choice in the past as well as those which will guide future decisions, (iii) influence direct neighbors to choose the same strategy, and (iv) persuade direct neighbors to convince other social peers to make the same choice. More generally, in coordination games with strategic uncertainty, communication can reduce variation in game outcomes and promote the play of the efficient Nash equilibrium strategy by making it focal (Blume and Ortmann 2007) . Thus, communication can lead to a higher program uptake, reduce or avoid coordination failure, and improve the ability of the AB scheme to generate the Pareto efficient outcome as has been presented by Parkhurst et al. (2002) and Warziniack et al. (2007) , and in more general settings by Charness (2000) . Warziniack et al. (2007) also find that pre-play communication reinforces producers' decisions to reach the Pareto efficient outcome
quickly. Yet, in a conservation auction with AB payments, Fooks et al. (2016) find that communication may lead to collusion and higher rent extraction. 6 Similarly, in more general designs the efficiencyenhancing role of pre-play communication is weak (Clark et al. 2001 ).
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The impact of communication is thus predicated on the nature of the strategic environment, as has also been established by Duffy and Feltovich (2002 
Experimental Design and Procedures
We report data from 24 sessions with 8 subjects per session, as summarized in Subjects could receive messages from neighbors for free despite having chosen not to communicate. This communication protocol is similar to the one implemented in Cooper et al. (1989) and represents the reality that communication is almost always costly for the sender whereas receiving messages (an email, voicemail or written communication) incurs minimal cost.
At the beginning of the experiment, every subject received a randomly-assigned ID that determined their location and their networked neighbors' identities. This ID remained the same in Phase I.
We implemented this fixed-matching protocol because private land ownership and operation is usually unchanged for long time periods and also because repeated interactions with the same set of subjects can foster coordination by building subjects' reputation for playing a particular strategy amongst their direct neighbors. At the beginning of Phase II the neighborhood structure was shuffled and every subject received a new ID and a new set of neighbors which remained unchanged henceforth. This ID switch was implemented to break any possible path dependence that is often present in coordination game experiments ( Van Huyck et al. 1993; Romero 2015 chat sentences separately, all messages within a chat room were encoded jointly and classified into different categories on the basis of a message classification scheme. The classification scheme was developed on the basis of review of two randomly drawn COMM sessions (one for each transaction cost ordering). The content of each chat room could be assigned to multiple categories. In order to minimize bias, the research assistants coded statements without being aware of the research questions and did not interact with each other during this exercise.
Since the coding is subjective, we measured inter-rater agreement using Cohen's Kappa (Cohen 1960; Krippendorff 2004 (Landis and Koch 1977) . Table 3 presents a sub-set of categories from the message classification scheme which were coded with Moderate and higher reliability.
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The experiment was implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007 ) and subjects were recruited from the broad undergraduate Purdue University population using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) during August 2013
and November 2014. All experiment instructions (included in Appendix B.III) were made available on subjects' computer screens. We did not include any contextual terminology relevant to ecosystem services provision other than land use because we wanted to study how financial incentives impact experimental outcomes and also because pro-environmental terminology can potentially trigger various subject behaviors and confound the treatment effect (Cason and Raymond 2011) .
Experiment instructions indicated that all subjects would be facing the same payoff table, that all AB scheme payoffs were net of the transaction costs of participation, and that the experiment would last for 30 periods. 12 Before starting the experiment, subjects participated in a quiz to verify their understanding. The sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Subjects were paid a $6 show-up fee and additional money earned during the experiment. An exchange rate of US$1 for 250 experimental currency (francs) was used to convert earnings, and average subject earnings (including the show-up fee) were $26.82.
Experimental Results
The results focus on the role of transaction costs and communication on (a) participation levels in the AB scheme, (b) the rates of efficient land use choice, and (c) the degree of spatial coordination on the efficient land use choice. 13 In Section 4.1, we present the results related to the first two aspects followed by the findings pertaining to spatial coordination in Section 4.2.
Participation and Efficient Land Use Choices
Consider first the findings from the non-communication ( indicates a statistically significant treatment effect at the 5% level (p-value = 0.015). 14 Thus, high transaction costs prove to be a deterrent for participation in the AB scheme, providing support for Hypothesis I. While this result is intuitive it is interesting to note that even if the high cost can generate forward induction tendencies (since conditional on participation, no coordination problem exists) and serve as a coordination mechanism, relative to low cost settings, it does not end up doing so. The weak negative trend for the low-cost setting indicates that transaction costs are less problematic at low values for AB scheme participation. Taken together these findings indicate that the effect of tacit communication 13 The Y land use (although not payoff efficient) is valuable for delivery of ecosystem services benefits, but is spatially explicit to a lesser degree in our model as reflected by the lower AB payment. However, our results focus on the participation and payoff efficient X choices because of the low frequency of Y choices in our experimental data (presented in Figure I in Appendix A), which makes it difficult to draw confident conclusions about Y land use for the current setting. 14 All nonparametric tests reported in the paper employ independent 8-person groups as the unit of observation.
is weak in promoting participation in our local network AB setting, a finding similar to Clark et al. (2001) as mentioned previously.
Result 1: High transaction costs can significantly reduce participation rates in the AB schemes.
The falling rates of participation across repeated interactions under both cost conditions may be attributed to factors that resolve subjects' strategic uncertainty (in favor of non-participation) and impact the likelihood of participation. First, unlike in a non-network coordination game, both direct and indirect neighbors influence payoffs but only past choices of direct neighbors are visible. The second factor is that, given the structure of the payoffs, participation and subsequent coordination on X is profitable only when both direct neighbors participate. This feature is true for both high and low transaction cost values, but losses induced by coordination failure are greater when costs are high. Figure I in Appendix A shows the percentage of X, Y and NP choices for both treatments for all periods. We observe 21% of Y choices when transaction costs are low and only 4% when costs are high in the NO-COMM groups. Thus, conditional on participation, most subjects select the efficient X strategy.
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The top panel of Figure II in Appendix A displays the percentage of X choices conditional on participation for both phases for both cost treatments for the 16 NO-COMM sessions. Wilcoxon MannWhitney tests indicate no significant difference in the rate at which X is chosen between high and low cost costs groups in both Phases I (p-value = 0.461) and Phase II (p-value = 0.368). Accordingly, our data do not provide support for Hypothesis II. Thus, while the transaction cost a priori is a deterrent for participation (with the high cost creating a bigger hurdle than the low cost), it does not hinder the AB's ability to incentivize efficient X choices by subjects who indeed participate. This result is true independent of subject experience. sessions. This is not surprising as dialogues are a more credible form of communication that can reduce strategic uncertainty and lead to more efficient outcomes, as has been found in two-player coordination games studied by Cooper et al. (1992) . 17 In the case of a monologue however the messaging player has no way of knowing if the receiver will respond appropriately. Blume (1998) notes here that, in games with costless one-way communication, in order for strategic uncertainty to be successfully resolved in favor of the efficient strategy, the sender's message should be self-signaling to the receiver; i.e., the receiver should believe that the sender is being truthful about message content. Similarly for the sender, the message needs to be self-committing, in that knowing that there is a high chance that the receiver is going to believe the content of the message, the sender will follow through with what he or she communicated.
The presence of the messaging fee in our study (and the high and low transaction costs incurred subsequently) potentially reinforces this self-committing and self-signaling behavior and thus elevates the credibility of messages conveyed through monologues, both for the senders and receivers.
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Focusing on the timing of communication, Figure 3 indicates that most messaging occurs in the early periods of both Phase I (nearly 65% of all chat rooms) when subjects are unfamiliar or have low levels of experience in the experiment and early in Phase II (remaining 35%) when subjects are reassigned to new neighbors. Such behavior is to be expected given the costly messaging setting because once coordination on a particular strategy has been established most subjects would rather only pay the 17 A key point to consider here is that when subjects exchange messages with their neighbors on the local network, it is possible that they receive conflicting messages about which AB game action to choose. In this situation the power of communication to reduce strategic uncertainty and to lead to efficient coordination may be reduced (Blume 1998 ). Yet the subsequent transaction cost stage (serving as a coordination mechanism) and fixed matching can help resolve problems with such conflicting messaging, increasing the likelihood of efficient coordination. 18 Note that the findings in Blume (1998) are based on a restrictive message space, unlike in this paper where we allow rich communication. Blume's theory is also based on randomized matching where there is a high chance that a large message space may lead to mis-coordination and coordination failure. In our study, fixed matching within a Phase, repeated interactions and learning builds reputation and familiarity in the game and reduces the chances of mis-coordination, despite a large message space.
transaction cost and rely on information feedback after every period to sustain participation and the efficient strategy choice.
Turning to the communication content, Table 3 presents the Cohen's Kappa values and the relative frequency of the different categories and sub-categories into which the messages were classified.
The most common category coded is "Influence neighbors to choose Strategy X" (Category 4X) with a frequency of 44%; i.e., in 44% of the chat rooms, a subject tried to influence a neighbor to select strategy X by sending a message such as "Pick X and we all win big". Moreover, across all COMM sessions we find that in 72 out of the 99 cases when subjects sent messages classified in this way, the neighbor receiving the communication selected X.
The second most common category with an average frequency of 33% is "Discuss experimental game features and payoffs" (Category 10). This category mainly includes messages that explain the value of coordination on strategy X to neighbors such as "If you participate and choose X you will see a much larger payoff". The category "Declare one's commitment to select Strategy X" (Category 1X) is coded with an average frequency of 28% and is often combined with Category 4X as is evident from the statement "I'm going to choose A. it would do well if you did the same. We will garner the most money this way". In fact 61 instances of X choices are observed in the periods in which players sent messages (through 65 chat rooms) conveying their commitment to strategy X. Such commitment is also predicated on past behavior. Of the subjects who communicated to neighbors that they were committed to X (in 44 chat rooms), 32 had chosen X in the previous period. 19 These findings support the self-signaling and selfcommitting conjectures Blume (1998) makes about behavior in games with one-way communication.
Finally, Category 8, denoting "Ask neighbors to influence their other neighbor's future strategy choice", has a frequency of 18%. This category highlights the fact that subjects recognize the importance of the network structure in transmitting information about sustained participation and efficient coordination from one person to other in "stages" as presented in Chwe (2000) . Thus, subject use 20 A key element of this paper is that endogenous communication possibilities cause different subjects to have different messaging profiles; that is, some never communicate, others communicate with both neighbors while the remaining communicate with only one neighbor in a period. This is interesting because the value of every message transmitted and subsequently its role in reducing strategic uncertainty needs to be evaluated in the context of all exchanged messages (Blume and Ortmann 2007) . However, in our paper we do not analyze messages and subject behavior by communication profiles, as these profiles are not exogenously imposed. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this as an interesting topic for future research.
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The dependent variable is the likelihood of participation in a period. The control variable is the dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the high cost sessions. 21 The standard errors are clustered by subject and period (Cameron et al. 2012) . The regression results are presented in Model (1) and Model (2) of Table 4 and suggest no significant transaction cost treatment effect in Phase I and a negative and significant effect in Phase II at 1% significance level. This result provides partial support (in Phase II only) for Hypothesis I for the COMM treatment. Note that this result contrasts with the finding in the NO-COMM treatment,
where the treatment effect is found in Phase I only.
In the COMM treatment subjects use communication to encourage their neighbors to participate, to generate commitment for choosing the efficient strategy, and to ensure that the willingness to participate and the commitment to choose X is passed on to other parts of the local network through direct 
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Considering differences in behavior driven by the communication treatment, relative to no communication we can draw two conclusions from Figure 1 . First, the participation rate is on average higher with communication than without it under both transaction cost conditions. Second, communication plays a more important role in the high transaction cost groups than in the low cost groups. Communication in high-cost groups averts the negative trend observed in the corresponding groups without communication in both phases, whereas in the low-cost groups behavior is relatively stable both with and without communication. For a statistical analysis of these claims, we employ 4 clustered logit regressions (one for each Phase and transaction cost condition). The dependent variable is again the likelihood of participation, which is regressed on a dummy variable equal to 1 for the COMM sessions, the reciprocal of the Period variable to control for learning and capture the time trends, and an interaction term between these two variables to account for differences in learning rates between treatments. All standard errors are clustered by subject and period. Table 5 presents the results in Models 
Spatial Coordination
This section presents an analysis of location-specific land use choices of all participants to assess the performance of the AB in creating spatially coordinated land use patterns. We develop a performance metric counting every instance where a subject and his/her two direct neighbors within their local neighborhood are able to locally coordinate on the same land use strategy. This metric can take a maximum value of 8, signifying that all 8 group members are perfectly or globally coordinated on either strategy X or Y. Any other lower non-zero value indicates only localized clustering of similar choices on the network. In this format, the same metric captures instances of both local and global coordination that are routinely observed in all groups during the experiment.
Let us start by examining spatial coordination under the no-communication regime. The top two panels of Figure 4 present the average levels of localized coordination on X by a subject and both of their neighbors (termed locally efficient coordination) in the NO-COMM groups for all periods of Phases I and II. This outcome is of special interest for the high-cost condition since the non-participation strategy NP strictly dominates option Y. For these groups, post-participation, forward induction reasoning can guide many adjacent subjects' choices to the Pareto efficient X equilibrium. While forward induction may not 22 In the sessions where messaging was free, observed participation and efficient choices were very near 100%. This outcome reiterates the observation that while communication does not eliminate any of the Nash equilibria of the game, the ability to send messages can make the efficient Nash equilibrium a focal point (thus reducing game strategic uncertainty) and can lead to greater rates of efficient play for both senders and receivers (Farrell 1987) . In that sense the presence of the free communication and transaction cost induced tacit communication reinforces the focal nature of the efficient equilibrium leading to near perfect efficient coordination.
explain the many adjacent X choices in the low-cost groups, the transaction cost serves as a costly tacitcommunication mechanism and focuses multiple neighbors' choices on X, which pays more than Y in the event of localized coordination.
A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test detects a significant difference in efficient localized coordination between low and high-cost groups without communication (p-value = 0.05) in Phase I after Period 8. This finding is aligned with the results supporting Hypothesis I as discussed previously. Since participation is significantly lower in the HLTC-NO-COMM sessions, so is overall AB performance. A reason for any significant difference appearing only after Period 8 is that in the initial periods subjects are unfamiliar with the strategic environment, so most X choices are either non-adjacent or are by two neighbors (which is not recorded by the performance metric).
With repeated interactions, participation rates fall in both groups, but they fall more steeply in the high-cost sessions (as an increasing number of subjects' strategic uncertainty gets resolved in favor of NP) causing fewer neighbors to choose X. As a result, rates of localized efficient coordination fall to about 14% in Period 15 in HLTC-NO-COMM groups. Performance is maintained between 40% and 50% in the LHTC-NO-COMM groups, where more people choose X and the participation rate has a weak negative trend, leading to the significant treatment effect. In Phase II there is no significant difference across transaction cost treatments, consistent with the previous result regarding no significant difference in participation rates. Phase. Group-level coordination is difficult -for any value of the transaction cost, it is challenging to get all group members to make the same choices, especially given that information feedback is limited to direct neighbors. Yet positive rates of global coordination suggest that, despite participation challenges, the AB scheme can sometimes fully coordinate environmentally-beneficial choices.
Result 4: With no explicit communication opportunities, greater transaction costs reduce localized efficient coordination only for inexperienced groups. Globalized efficient coordination is not significantly impacted by variation in the transaction cost values.
Let us now compare rates of spatial coordination with communication. The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the percentage of localized coordination in the COMM groups by transaction cost for both phases. A surprising result is that in Phase I, localized coordination is greater in the HLTC-COMM groups relative to the LHTC-COMM groups. This difference is marginally significant at the 10% level on the basis of a 2-way clustered logit regression (Table 4 Table 4 shows that this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level on the basis of a 2-way clustered logit regression.
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Finally, we compare localized coordination rates with and without communication. Models (5) through (8) in Table 5 
Result 5: Explicit communication opportunities lead to significantly improved AB performance relative to baseline situations where communication is tacit. This effect is true for all levels of game experience when groups face high transaction costs. For low cost groups, the beneficial effect of communication is
contingent on whether they faced high costs in the past.
Discussion
Our study results are of course predicated on the nature of the strategic environment, i.e., the payoff functions under either high or low transaction costs, the size and circular nature of the local network, and the degree of information feedback. A circular network does not describe many real world settings where an AB policy could be introduced. Using a spatial set-up different from the circular network (such as a line or lattice) may produce different results, since some individuals will have different numbers of neighbors, and will therefore face different levels of strategic uncertainty and payoffs. In the context of coordination games, Cassar (2007) finds that the frequency of payoff-dominant choices is higher in a "small world" or a "random" network than in a local network such as the one we consider. She also finds that coordination is obtained much faster in the small world setting, while noting that "a theory linking network characteristics to individual behavior is not yet available" (page 228).
However, compared to networks where strategic uncertainty varies across players, we could argue that the circular network provides a lower bound on coordination failure in an AB setting.
We could have chosen a transaction cost value less than 40, which would not have made Y strictly dominated by NP. We conjecture that this would lead to much greater participation and many more Y choices than is currently observed under the high-cost treatment. While this is interesting, this finding is similar to results obtained in Banerjee et al. (2014) and could have eliminated (i) any difference between high-cost and low-cost groups and (ii) subjects' ability to use forward induction to guide their behavior in our network AB coordination game. Moreover, the transaction cost treatment is more interesting if it generates differences in the set of equilibria compared to when it just produces a difference in net payoffs.
This leads to an interesting thought experiment: if a regulator wishes to increase participation or efficient localized coordination in an AB scheme for a given budget, is it better to spend this money on increasing the baseline (participation) subsidy, or on subsidizing the transactions costs that participants face (e.g. by providing free advice)? In our experiment, no real difference exists in the effects of these actions if the subsidy increase is equivalent for schemes X and Y, other than in the framing of the payments. But targeting the baseline subsidy increase at X only could increase the uptake of this land use relative to Y or non-participation by more than an equivalent reduction in transactions costs. Unfortunately, we were unable to test whether significant differences in desired spatial coordination emerge from such reallocation of funds in the lab.
The size of the circular network and nature of information feedback may also impact behavior.
More information and smaller group sizes usually generate greater rates of efficient choices in coordination games. However, with a group size of 8 we believe we have struck a reasonable middle ground whereby the group is small enough for many individuals to choose X and large enough for many to select NP or Y (owing to high strategic uncertainty). With this group size we are able to assess the extent to which the AB can still deliver on its environmental goal when the effect of each individual is relatively small compared to the total group. Finally, we could have provided information to subjects beyond their local neighborhoods (e.g., on their indirect neighbors such as in Banerjee et al., 2014) .
Although this would be inconsistent with our localized communication format, it provides an avenue for future research especially if regulatory agencies start publicly announcing enrollment rates in order to promote greater participation. It is also possible that coordination failure would have implications for what participants consider "fair", and this could influence the likelihood of coordination on the Paretosuperior equilibrium, especially if outcomes are observable such as in Reeson et al. (2011) .
Conclusions
PES schemes are increasingly being implemented as policy mechanisms to enhance the supply of ecosystem services. The predominant property rights regime in countries such as the US, the UK, New
Zealand and Australia requires that producers be financially compensated to encourage the supply of ecosystem services, rather than being compelled to do so by regulation: the "provider gets" principle (Hanley et al., 1998) . Second, for many environmental outcomes, spatial coordination increases the size of environmental benefits for a given level of enrollment in voluntary conservation programs. The policy design challenge is to find systems of incentives that spatially coordinate a voluntary sign-up program.
The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is one such mechanism. However, the AB faces a number of potential problems, including the tendency over time for participants to converge on risk-dominant outcomes, a lack of cost-effectiveness, and, like many incentive programs, the size and nature of transaction costs. To date, the effects of transactions costs have not been investigated in the AB literature, despite their importance to PES scheme participation decisions.
In this paper we use a laboratory experiment to investigate how private transaction costs affect the degree of participation in an AB scheme, its efficiency and the patterns of spatial coordination in the Explicit communication is costly and adds to the transaction costs incurred, but it improves outcomes largely because it can reduce the strategic uncertainty associated with participation and coordination in the AB scheme. There are clear parallels here with experimental findings on the implications of communication (albeit costless) in "ambient" pollution tax schemes (Segerson, 1988) , where the pollution tax liability of each firm depends on group behavior. For example, Suter et al. (2008) find that allowing participants to communicate in a non-binding fashion produces lower pollution levels and maximizes group profits. Our communication results can also be compared with the effects of costless communication in experiments on Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms for public goods, such as in Isaac and Walker (1988) , where nonbinding group discussion significantly reduced free-riding behavior.
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The policy implications of our results are clear: if the regulator can design an AB scheme in a way which keeps transaction costs low relative to the payoffs of coordination, then it will be easier to achieve spatial coordination (both locally and globally). This, in turn, enhances a more effective delivery of ecosystem services. However, if achieving a given environmental objective requires writing (complicated) rules for potential participants, then there is a trade-off between improving environmental effectiveness and increasing coordination, since such complications will increase transactions costs. Set against this scenario, facilitating low-cost communication between producers would improve the likelihood of successful coordination towards socially-desirable land use patterns. Providing subsidies to lower transaction costs during the initial phases of a PES program would also foster coordination, and our results suggest that improved performance could persist even after such subsidies are removed and transaction costs increase. Your unique Identification number -ID for this experiment is 1. This number is private and should not be shared with anyone. You will have this ID for the next 15 periods of the experiment.
TABLES
Please click "OK" when you are ready.
General Information:
This is an experiment in decision making. In today's experiment you will participate in a group decision task. In addition to a $6 participation fee, you will be paid the money you accumulate from your choices which will be described to you in a moment. Upon the completion of the experiment, your earnings will be added up and you will be paid privately, in cash. The exact amount you will receive will be determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others. From this point forward all units of account will be in experimental francs. At the end of the experiment, experimental francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at the rate of 1 U.S. dollar for every 250 experimental francs.
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to you. Please do not talk, exclaim, and look at the computer screens of other participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating the rules may be asked to leave the experiment and may not be paid.
Please click "Continue" when you are ready.
Today's Decision Making Task:
The experiment will have thirty periods. In each period you will be in a group with 7 other participants. You and all the other players are arranged around a circle. The diagram of this circle is included in the handout that has been provided to you. The black dots on the circle represent your location. On this circle, you have two neighbors -a right or anti-clockwise neighbor and a left or clockwise neighbor. You will never know the identity of your neighbors. Your ID will determine who your neighbors are. Please keep in mind that every player has a different set of neighbors. Thus if you are Player 8 then your right or anti-clockwise neighbor is Player 7 and left or clockwise neighbor is Player 1. Similarly Player 7 has you as their left or clockwise neighbor and Player 6 as their right or anti-clockwise neighbor. Your ID and your neighbors will be the same for the first 15 periods of the experiment. At the beginning of Period 16, everyone will be provided with a different ID. As a result of this ID change, your neighbors between Periods 16 and 30 will be different from those between Periods 1 and 15. Also please remember that the person sitting at the computer terminal beside you is not your neighbor in the experiment.
During this experiment each of you will assume the role of a landowner who can participate in a land management program or opt out of it. In both cases, you will receive money for your actions. You will first be given the option to participate in this program. If you choose not to participate, you will receive a payment. Participation is costly and so you have to incur a cost to do so. Once you have incurred the cost, you will be able to take part in a group decision task which is part of the land management program. In this task, you will make a choice between two types of land use actions denoted by A and B. You will receive a payment based on your choice of A or B. Since this is a group decision task, your payment will depend on the choices made by your neighbors as well. In a moment we will give you a detailed description of how your payment will be determined.
Please note that you may decide to participate in the task but one or both of your neighbors may choose not to. Also while you decide to participate, you will not know what choices your neighbors' are making.
Please raise your hand if there are any questions otherwise click "Continue".
Your Payment from Group Decision Task:
If you choose to participate in the land management program, then in each period of the experiment, the computer will display a table such as the one shown below. This Payoff Please note that when you will be asked to participate or not, you will know the value of the cost you have to incur. In general, your payoff from the group decision task increases when you choose the same action as your participating neighbors.
Also your payoffs are the same if 1) one or both neighbors participate and choose a different strategy than you or 2) they don't participate at all. For example, the payment to you from choosing B and both of your neighbors choosing A is the same as you choosing B and none of your neighbors participating. If that is the case, you will be able to send messages to the neighbors with whom you have paid to chat and they will be able to view these messages. Similarly, you may have chosen not to chat with your neighbors but one or both of them paid a fee to chat with you. They will be able to send messages to you which you will be able to view. Making a choice in a period: (No-Comm) Once the period starts, each of you will first choose whether to participate or not. If you decide not to participate, then you will receive a fixed payoff. This payoff does not depend upon your neighbors' participation decisions. If you decide to participate, then in the next stage, you will choose strategy A or B by clicking on one of the buttons that will appear on the right of your screen. You may change your choice as often as you like, but once you click on OK your choice for that period is final.
Note that when you are making a choice, you will not know what choices others are making. Also, remember that you will never know the identity of anyone else in your group, meaning that all choices are confidential and that no one will ever know what choices you make.
At the end of each period after you have made your choices, your screen will display your choice and payoff. Information will also be provided about whether your neighbors participated and if they did, what were their choices for that period. Information on your accumulated payment through the current period will also be provided. At the end of the experiment, you will receive the sum of your payments from all thirty periods converted to real dollars. This will be paid to you privately in cash.
Before starting the experiment you will participate in a quiz on the next screen. Please note that you will not earn any money from participating in the quiz i.e. this is a non-paying period. Your answers in this quiz will not influence your final payoffs at the end of the experiment.
Making a choice in a period: (Comm)
Once The cost of participating in the land management program for the remaining 15 periods is 15.
If you choose not to participate, then you will receive a payoff of 175. This payoff is not dependent on the choices of your neighbors and is as mentioned the same for all 30 periods.
As mentioned before, all figures in the Payoff Table are net of the participation cost, i.e., the participation cost has already been deducted from the payoffs.
Please remember that your new ID is 4 and your new neighbors are Player 5 and Player 3. Everyone else has a different ID as well. Thus your neighbors between Periods 16 and 30 are different from your neighbors between Periods 1 and 15. However your neighbors during the next 15 periods of the experiment will remain the same.
Once you have received the handout, please click OK to continue.
